

# International Transparency Report

2025 | 2nd half



**verizon**

# Verizon's Transparency Report for the second half of 2025

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## International report

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Verizon's Transparency Report presents the number of demands we received from law enforcement in the United States and other countries where we did business during the second half of 2025.

We report the number of demands for customer information that we received during the second half of 2025 from law enforcement in each country outside the U.S. where we did business (and had such demands in recent years) and where reporting such information is not legally prohibited. The table below reports the number of demands we received during the second half of 2025. Following that number, in parentheses, is the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands. The table reports data from the past several years. Data from prior periods can be found by clicking the "Read archives" button at the bottom of the page.

A few notes about the table: A "customer selector" is an information point, such as a telephone number or IP address, that is used to identify a given customer. While our initial Transparency Reports displayed only the number of customer selectors, we now also report the number of demands we received. To provide more detail, we have divided the number of demands in the table below into two categories. A demand for "subscriber information" typically requires that we provide the name and address of the customer assigned to a given phone number or IP address. A demand for "transactional information" may seek, for instance, a log of numbers called.

We also report the number of lawful demands, if any, for intercepts (and the number of customer selectors at issue in those demands) that we received from law enforcement in Germany and the Netherlands, which are the only countries other than the U.S. where we have received demands to intercept content and where we are not precluded from reporting.

While the laws in each country may differ, Verizon has trained professionals that carefully review each demand we receive. We review the demands based on each country's laws, and we only produce information in response to valid demands. We note that the vast majority of demands we receive are legally valid, but we push back on those that are not. We do not produce information in response to all demands (even if valid) when, for instance, we do not have any responsive data to produce. For example, in the second half of 2025, we had no records responsive to most of the demands we received from law enforcement in Germany, one of the countries making the most inquiries.

Finally, there are some limits to what we can disclose regarding law enforcement demands. In Australia and India, as explained in more detail in the notes accompanying the table, we are precluded from reporting some or all details about the legal process we receive. In addition, some countries in which Verizon does business require relevant government authorities to have direct access to data of telecommunications providers. In the Netherlands, for instance, the law requires that telecommunications providers transfer their subscriber data to a central database that can be directly accessed by Dutch law enforcement, as explained in footnote 4.

## Demands for customer data (outside of the United States)

\*Number of demands (Number of customer selectors in those demands)

Country	2H 2023 subscriber information	2H 2023 transactional information	1H 2024 subscriber information	1H 2024 transactional information	2H 2024 subscriber information	2H 2024 transactional information	1H 2025 subscriber information	1H 2025 transactional information	2H 2025 subscriber information	2H 2025 transactional information
Australia <sup>1</sup>	1	0	8	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0
Austria	20(20)	0	31(31)	0	47(47)	0	69(69)	0	75(75)	0
Belgium	171(183)	0	118(282)	0	119(143)	0	148(148) <sup>†</sup>	0	174(174)	0
France	156(176)	3(6)	149(149)	1(1)	163(172)	2(2)	132(156)	2(3)	121(130)	1(1)
Germany <sup>2</sup>	10(10)	494(494)	7(7)	475(475)	0	488(488)	1(1)	432(432)	6(6)	420(420)
India <sup>3</sup>										
Italy	11(11)	25(25)	14(14)	39(39)	0	46(46)	0	46(46)	26(26)	23(23)
Netherlands <sup>4</sup>	36(36)	1,069(1,069)	31(31)	1,018(1,018)	25(25)	4,859(4,859)	0	926(926)	0	1,005(1,005)
Poland	4(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	493(1,126)	170(399)	62(62)
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	2(2)	0	0	0
Singapore	0	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0	0	0
Spain	9(9)	0	10(10)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1(1)	0
Switzerland	9(9)	0	10(10)	0	15(15)	0	20(2)	0	25(25)	0
United Kingdom	14(14)	0	11(11)	0	5(5)	0	13(13)	0	15(15)	0

### Table notes:

1. In Australia, we are precluded by law from reporting the number of warrants we received from law enforcement for interceptions or stored communications. As such, for Australia, we provide only the numbers of demands for subscriber information and transactional information.
2. In Germany, in addition to legal demands for subscriber information and transactional information, we received demands for lawful intercepts. During the second half of 2025, we received 1,385 such demands regarding 1,388 customer selectors. All of these demands were for the interception of calls initiated in Germany and made to specified international numbers.
3. In India, we are precluded by law from discussing any information about the requests that we might receive from the Government of India. We are similarly precluded from identifying the specific number of websites that we were asked to block by the Government of India.
4. In the Netherlands, the Central Information Point for Telecommunications ("CIOT" in Dutch) program run by the Ministry of Justice requires telecommunications providers to store all subscriber data (name, address, service provided, name of provider, telephone numbers, IP-addresses, and email addresses) in a central database that is accessible to Dutch law enforcement. The information we report here does not include access by Dutch law enforcement to customer data stored in the CIOT database. The Dutch government provides its own report on law enforcement access to the information stored by all providers in the CIOT database: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2025/02/12/jaarverslag-ciot-2024>. We did not receive any demands for lawful intercepts in the Netherlands during the second half of 2025.

† This number has been revised. There was a typographical error in a prior version of this report.



## No extraterritorial demands

Verizon provides cloud computing and data storage services to business customers around the world, including many non-U.S. customers in data centers outside the U.S. In our prior Transparency Reports, we advised that we had not received any demands from the U.S. government for data stored in other countries during the periods covered in those Transparency Reports. Likewise, we did not receive any demands from the U.S. government for data stored in other countries during the second half of 2025. Nor do we anticipate that we will receive such a demand going forward.



## Blocking demands and other restrictions

On occasion, we are required by government orders, regulations, or other legal requirements to block access to specified websites. We review these orders carefully to ensure they are valid government orders authorized by law. To be clear, these are requests to block access to a website, not requests to remove user content. We did not receive any requests from any government to remove user content during this reporting period.

Although we have not received blocking demands in the U.S., we have received such demands in a handful of other countries. Generally, the blocking demands are issued because the websites are contrary to laws in those countries relating to online gambling, copyright, or child sexual abuse material. The government agencies that issue these blocking demands differ from country to country, and we comply with all such demands.

While some countries have laws permitting the government to compel service providers in those countries to shut down or restrict communications services in those countries, Verizon has never received such an order. If we did receive such an order, we would determine its legal validity and try to limit any impact on our network and on our customers' freedom of expression.

The figures below relate to the number of websites that we were required to block access to during the relevant period of time. While we may be required to block access to such websites in the specified countries for an ongoing period of time, we count such demands only for the period during which they were initially made, except in Colombia. In Colombia, we are now provided with a running list of websites that we are required to block, so we now report the total number of websites designated on that list at the end of each period. We were also required to block access to websites in India, but we are precluded by law from identifying the specific number of websites. In addition to the countries listed below, we are currently blocking Russian websites in the European Union due to the current state of European Union sanctions against Russia.

Country	1H 2022	2H 2022	1H 2023	2H 2023	1H 2024	2H 2024	1H 2025	2H 2025
Argentina				29	0	1,542	356	504
Belgium	70	31	15	35	48	22	69	169
Brazil		10	268	2,509	3,208	11,398	11,642	6
Colombia	11,553	16,379	29,482	31,115	38,860	23,706	24,692	33,664
Czech Republic	606	2,491	185	126	354	18	854	561
France					2,472	208	96	11
Greece	904	1,666	2,535	1,173	2,131	1,767	1,123	705
Hungary	633	45	45	26	255	343	2,016	108
Italy	481	108	123	381	442	179	777	417
Poland	7,568	2,346	4,621	2,666	2,106	2,195	1,168	983
Slovakia	40	37	17	21	22	0	0	60
Switzerland	117	475	206	348	302	219	491	382